

Banking Industry Update

Saltmarsh BankTalk 2023

Presenters



Chris Choate

Managing Director, Financial Services Investment Banking

Experience

Ryan, Beck & Co.



Education



30+ years experience



Brian Nestor

Managing Director, Financial Services Investment Banking

Experience



Education





20+ years experience

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State of the Banking Market

US Banking structure since the advent of Interstate Banking

2010's Dodd-Frank ('10) associated regulatory response places large cap M&A largely on hold • Small banks capitalize on large bank challenges leading to outperformance & valuation "sweet spot" 2008-2009 **Early 2000's** • GFC deals solidify Pre-GFC combinations continue winners & losers forming basis of TBTF banks amongst global SIFIs Next tier superregionals formed • De novo wave flourishes as opportunities arise from first wave 1990's of consolidation • Riegle-Neal ('94) kicks off the decade to create first nationwide banks • Glass Stegall replaced by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ('99) allowing greater consolidation of financial institutions **PNC** JPMorganChase 🚺 **WELLS FARGO** CHASE BANK ONE. **REGIONS AMSOUTH** B Compass **NationsBank BBVA** 223 De novos chartered in 2000 **WELLS FARGO** (peak of early 2000's) BANK ONE. First Bank Chicago

The Travelers

2020-2022

COVID response (e.g. PPP, etc) led to socialization of credit and an early wave of "sweet spot-banks" looking for scale to achieve synergies

 Rapid rise in interest rates & corresponding deposit volatility leads to panic amongst smaller banks especially those with unique attributes





2023



2022

2021



DIME

2019

SunTrust[®]

2008-2018

large caps by ~15%

BB&T


Small cap banks outperform

AllegianceBancshares, Inc. CBTX, INC.

What's next?


- Disappearance of "sweet spot", need for scale & challenges to funding models is likely to create significant merger wave
- Reset to \$100B for community/ smaller regional banks (new "super community banks")
- Emergence of \$250B class of banks creating a band of 10-15 super regional banks


NASDAQ Bank — 81% underperformance since the start of 2018




Note: Market data as of August 18, 2023 Source: S&P Capital IO Pro


2023 liquidity crisis | How it started






Government response | Inflation








⁽¹⁾ Unrealized loss data includes all US banks (public and private) that file a Call Report; shown at the bank-level

⁽²⁾ Monthly data as of August 1, 2023


⁽³⁾ Weekly data as of August 16, 2023

Spread analysis vs. Nasdaq Bank and S&P 500

2-10 year spread




Backdrop | Liquidity is being squeezed




⁽¹⁾ Weekly deposit data as of August 9, 2023
(2) Median quarterly values of nationwide public banks with \$1B - \$50B in assets
Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)

Backdrop | Deposit outflow






Inverse Relationship: Banks turn to Wholesale Funding



Backdrop | Wholesale funding

Wholesale funding channels have been tapped in order to fill the gap given deposit outflows and to create on balance sheet liquidity




Note: Industry data sums balances for all commercial banks as of June 30, 2023

⁽²⁾ Reliance on Wholesale Funding defined as [(Total borrowings) + (Brokered Deposits)] / [(Total borrowings) + (Total Deposits)]. This ratio depicts the portion of a bank's total funds that are from wholesale sources



⁽¹⁾ FRED 3-Month Rates and Yields: Certificates of Deposit for the United States

Backdrop | Deposit betas



					What if	
	1999-2000	2004-2007	2016-2019	2022-Q22023	55% Beta?	ı
Starting IBD Cost	3.93	1.35	0.35	0.16	0.16	
Ending IBD Cost	4.84	3.76	1.19	2.37	2.89	
Change in IBD Cost	0.91	2.41	0.84	2.21	2.73	
Starting FF Rate	4.75	1.01	0.39	0.12	0.12	
Ending FF Rate	6.52	5.25	2.40	4.99	5.08	
Change in FF Rate	1.77	4.24	2.00	4.87	4.96	
Deposit Beta	51.4%	56.8%	41.9%	45.4%	55.0%	

A 55% Deposit Beta in the current cycle would imply that the IBD Cost increases an additional 52bps

FED proposes new bank capital standards for banks greater than \$100B in assets



Internal modeling being replaced with standardized risk weighting



Introduce operational risk using firms' historical operational losses



Capital levels adjusted for losses/gains on **AFS** securities



Introduce long-term debt bail to recapitalize the bank in resolution by issuing loss-absorbing debt



Stress tests should be stressful and continue to evolve and improve risk capture



Expect strengthened LCR requirements and closer scrutiny of degree and duration of interest rate risk




The average CET1 balance could increase 16.6% while the CET1 ratio could increase 1.8% on average between 2022-2024


Source: Raymond James Equity Research

Earnings under pressure with NIMs peaking


EPS growth (%)



Pre-provision net revenue growth (%)




Net interest income growth (%)





NIM change (bps)




Credit remains benign, although NCOs expected to tick up










Investors turn focus to CRE, and office in particular


Credit quality deterioration is anticipated as \$1.4T of CRE is expected to mature over the next two years

\$4.5T total CRE debt by source




Banks	\$1,711B
CMBS, CDO or ABS	757B
Life Insurance Companies	646B
GSE	921B
Other	438B
Total	\$4,473B

\$1.4T 2023 – 2024 CRE debt maturities by type




Apartments	\$440B
Office	306B
Industrial	133B
Retail	119B
Lodging	161B
Healthcare	26B
Other	203B
Total	\$1,388B



Growing negative carry suggests more balance sheet restructuring

Change in security yield vs. change in interest-bearing liabilities cost



Consensus EPS percentage changes

2024E EPS vs. 2023E EPS growth (decline)

Percentage change of consensus estimates for 2024 vs 2023 as of August 18, 2023

Percentage EPS Growth (Decline) <\$10B in total assets

(2.1%)

\$10B - \$20B in total assets

(3.1%)

\$20B - \$50B in total assets

>\$50B in total assets

(2.6%)

(2.3%)

2024E EPS consensus revisions

Percentage change of consensus estimates between January 1, 2023 and August 18, 2023

EPS Revision Percentage

total assets (22.4%)

<\$10B in

\$10B - \$20B in total assets

(24.2%)

\$20B - \$50B in total assets

>\$50B in total assets

(19.4%)

(21.2%)

Banks in favor

Key characteristics of banks currently "in favor"



Lower uninsured deposits



Higher consumer deposit mix



More rural deposit base



High cash balances and strong capital post-HTM marks



Strong markets with low loan growth guidance



Higher loan loss reserves / loss absorption capacity



Lower CRE / C&D concentrations



Manageable dividend payout ratios and lower share repurchases




Lower loan / deposit ratio and funding risk with a lower concentration in loans and deposits overall





Despite near-term industry key characteristics, size and scale continue to be the "constant" driver of value

Bank Valuation Environment

Size and scale drive value








Note: Market data as of August 18, 2023; financial data as of June 30, 2023

(2) Includes all public US banks \$1B to \$20B Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro; FactSet

⁽¹⁾ Includes nationwide major exchange-traded banks

Size leads to a premium valuation



The capital markets are at a stand still

Short-term inactivity likely to continue with limited exceptions



YoY Issuance Trends Common Equity: (1) ~ (85.9%) Sub Debt: (2) ~ (99.6%) Preferred: (3) ~ (98.4%)

Banking sector investor sentiment

Generalists

Weak sentiment has deteriorated even further with fallout from recent bank failures

Increasingly underweight the bank sector and likely will not return until visibility into credit cycle becomes more clear

Bank dedicated investors

More optimistic on sector given attractive valuations and potential for a softer landing

Increasingly cautious on street EPS estimates with buyside estimates well-below current EPS forecasts

Current focus is on structural profitability and credit performance

Note: Compares the change in bank underwriting & advisory gross offering amounts between 2023 YTD (Annualized) versus the average of 2021 & 2022 levels

⁽¹⁾ Includes equity issuances announced by U.S. banks less than \$50B in MRQ total assets, excludes mutual conversions


⁽²⁾ Includes subordinated debt issuances announced by U.S. banks less than \$50B in MRQ total assets

⁽³⁾ Incudes preferred equity issuances announced by U.S. banks less than \$50B in MRQ total assets Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro

P/TBV
valuations
approached
COVID lows
when excluding
AOCI

Larger institutions with deposit bases deemed volatile have seen the biggest pullback


P/TBV valuations for public banks and thrifts with total assets between \$1B - \$10B



Bank valuation discount to the market widening

Consensus forward (NTM) earnings multiples since 2012

NASDAQ Bank P / NTM E



Note: Market data as of August 18, 2023 Source: FactSet

How much are current bank valuations pricing in recessionary credit losses?

Methodology

- TBV dilution occurs exclusively through net charge-offs
- Assumes normalized P/TBV as of YE 2019 (excl. AOCI)
- Commensurate level of NCOs required to dilute TBVPS such that current trading price would equate to the prepandemic trading multiple


Takeaways

- Assuming all else equal, current multiples assume recessionary-level losses (much higher than current consensus estimates)
- Unlikely for all these losses to materialize and reach the magnitude of the Great Financial Crisis as banks have improved underwriting standards and strengthened balance sheets

	Price / TBV	(excl. AOCI)	Implied NCOs Bas	ed on Valuation	Mean Consensu	ıs Estimates	Δ Implied vs.
	2019 YE (%)	Current (%)	Aggregate NCOs (\$M)	NCO Ratio (%)	Cumulative '23-'24E NCOs (\$M)	Cummulative NCO Ratio (%)	Estimated NCO Ratio (%)
RJ Research Coverage Median	172%	105%	\$343	1.71%	\$30	0.14%	1.57%

M&A Overview

After strong post-COVID rebound, activity slowing since 2022



M&A at a standstill

YTD M&A Activity⁽¹⁾

M&A Deals

Deal Value

48

M&A Deals Under M&A Deals with Over \$100mm in \$100mm in Deal Value Value

Government Undisclosed Deal Assisted Deals Terminated Deals

M&A Activity Since 2022⁽³⁾

Southeast	41 deals	173% DV / TBV	107% Pay-to-Trade
Nationwide	229 deals	152% <i>DV / TBV</i>	98% Pay-to-Trade

Recent M&A Activity⁽²⁾





























Major Government Assisted Deals





Assets	\$109B
Loans	\$71B
Deposits	\$89B



Assets	\$110B
Loans	\$72B
Deposits	\$56B

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.



Assets	\$3.74T		Assets	\$233B
Loans	\$1.11T	M	Loans	\$173B
Deposits	\$2.38T		Deposits	\$92B

⁽¹⁾ M&A activity includes all U.S. depository M&A in 2023

⁽²⁾ Includes all U.S. depository M&A deals with announced deal value in 2023

⁽³⁾ Includes all Southeast and Nationwide deals since January 1, 2022; excludes terminated transactions Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro

Interest rates impact on standalone financials

(\$M, except per share data)				
Pricing Information		202202		202202
Stock Price Shares Outstanding (M) Price / TBVPS Price / TBVPS (exl. AOCI) Price / NTM EPS		\$24.00 50 157% 145% 12.0x		\$8.00 22 120% 102% 8.8x
Standalone Assumptions		2023Q2		2023Q2
YTD Securities Mark Down Securities Duration (years) ROAA		-2.5% 5.0 1.00%		-5.0% 7.0 1.00%
Balance Sheet		2023Q2		2023Q2
Securities AFS		1,463		285
Securities HTM		150		30
Other Assets		8,563		1,710
Total Assets	\$	10,176	\$	2,025
Total Liabilities	\$	8,673	\$	1,733
Common Equity		900		260
Retained Earnings		670		58_
L AOCI		(68)		(26)
Total Equity	\$	1,503	\$	292
Total Liabilities & Equity	\$	10,176	\$	2,025
Total Liabilities & Equity	Ţ	10,170	7	2,023
TCE Ratio		8.1%	*******	7.8%
TCE Ratio (excl. AOCI)		8.8%		9.2%
TBVPS		\$15.25		\$6.68
TBVPS (excl. AOCI)		\$16.60		\$7.86
AOCI / TCE		-8.9%		-17.7%
AFS Securities / TA		15.5 %		15.2 %

Interest rates impact on M&A

Under current environment, interest rate related merger adjustments can create higher dilution to book and higher accretion to EPS

High Level Merger Assumptions		Amrt SL
Purchase Price	\$10.00	
Cost Savings	30%	
Stock Consderation	100%	
HTM Securities Mark	-20.0%	7.0 yrs
Loan Interest Rate Mark	-5.0%	4.0 yrs
Time Deposit Mark	-2.5%	2.0 yrs

Transaction Multiples

Price / TBVPS 150%

Price / TBVPS (excl. AOCI) 127%

Price / NTM EPS 10.9x

Price / NTM EPS + CS 7.5x

Market Premium 25%

Core Deposit Premium 5.6%

CAAP Accounting

22.6%
NTM Accretion to EPS

-10.4%
Dilution to TBVPS at Close

7.2%
TBV Earnback

7.2%
TCE Ratio

9.6%
NTM Accretive
TBV Earnback

Key Financial Results:
Excluding AOCI & Rate Marks

1.4%
Accretion to EPS

8.8%
TCE Ratio

Current M&A themes



Buyer Selectivity



First Mover Advantage



Macro Signals to Watch



Achieving Scale



Premium Valuation

Additional Observations



M&A volume will likely continue to be muted in Q3 2023 and Q4 2023



Stability within the public markets and interest rate environment will be key drivers for renewed M&A activity



Industry headwinds will weigh on smaller banks, driving consolidation as a means of achieving scale and stronger performance



When the M&A markets do return, those who are "ready to act" will achieve the highest valuations

M&A regulatory outlook

Is bank M&A heading back to normal?

Biden
Administration
officials signal
openness to
consolidation

Hsu, Yellen, and Barr have signaled an **increasing open-mindedness towards bank consolidation** within the Biden Administration



DOJ to revisit role in merger reviews

The DOJ will revisit their bank merger guidelines to incorporate a **much wider range of competitive factors** in order to address "modern market realities". This will likely focus on impacts to customer segments, customer choice, and increased coordination



Opposition from key figures?

Senator Warren and progressive groups have come out in **strong opposition to**potential increases in bank consolidation




Buyer price outperformance post Great Recession

Overview of analysis

- Dataset includes all whole bank and FDIC assisted bank transactions announced between 1/1/2008 – 12/31/2012 with public buyers
- Each buyer's price performance is compared to the NASDAQ bank index over the following time period:
 - Start date: 7 days before the announce date of their first announced transaction
 - End date: 3 months after the close of their final transaction

Subset	Number of institutions	Buyer price performance vs. NASDAQ Bank (avg.)
All buyers	233	5.1%
Buyers that completed:		
2 or more acquisitions	106	15.4%
2 acquisitions	54	13.4%
3 acquisitions	17	14.2%
4 acquisitions	16	11.8%
5 acquisitions	7	27.6%
6 or more acquisitions	12	22.7%

Many reasons over time to do nothing



Note: S&P 500 return from March 1, 2009 to August 18, 2023

Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro

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